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Bad Faith Insurance Litigation in Pennsylvania:
Recurring Issues Under Section 8371
Tina M. Oberdorf*
INTRODUCTION
Five years after the Pennsylvania General Assembly created
for insureds a statutory remedy for the bad faith conduct of their
insurers,' by enacting Section 8371 of title 42 ("Section 8371"),
2
the meaning and scope of this section have still not been clearly
defined. Section 8371 permits courts to award interest, punitive
damages and attorney's fees against insurers who have acted in
"bad faith." The problems that courts and practitioners have
encountered with the statute are mainly due to the legislature's
failure to provide a statutory definition of "bad faith" and its
failure to provide the standards a court should apply when de-
termining what damages should be awarded. As a result, courts
and practitioners have been forced to deal with a host of com-
plex issues when litigating bad faith cases. This article identifies
and discusses those issues which commonly arise in the course
* B.A. University of Pittsburgh, J.D. Duquesne University School of Law.
Law clerk to the Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose, United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania. The opinions and comments expressed herein
are solely those of the author.
The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Judge Ambrose and Joseph
A. Hudock, Jr., Esq. for their expertise and assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. This cause of action has also been referred to as a "first-party" bad faith
case. As one writer has indicated:
A "first party" bad faith case is where the bad faith cause of action is based
on the insurer's handling of a claim to policy benefits directly to an insured,
as opposed to a "third party" case, which is based on the insurer's wrongful
handling of a third party's claim against the insured under a liability policy.
Joseph Decker, Insurer Liability Under Pennsylvania's Bad Faith Statute, PA. B.
ASS'N Q., April, 1994, at 45.
2. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (Supp. 1994).
3. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371.
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of first-party bad faith litigation, and analyzes the different
methods that Pennsylvania state and federal courts have uti-
lized in resolving these recurring issues.
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND EARLY CHALLENGES
D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty
Insurance Co.
Historically,4 Section 8371, also known as Pennsylvania's bad
faith statute, was enacted as a delayed legislative response to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in D'Ambrosio v.
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co.5 In
D'Ambrosio, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for his in-
surance company's alleged wrongful refusal to pay a property
damage claim.' In addition to compensatory damages for the
property damage claim, the plaintiff sought punitive damages
and damages for emotional distress for the insurer's alleged bad
faith conduct in denying the claim.7 Addressing the issue of
punitive damages and emotional distress, the court held that the
Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act' served adequately
to deter bad faith conduct on the part of insurers.' The court
rejected the plaintiffs claims for punitive and emotional distress
damages based on its finding that it was not appropriate to
supplement the system of sanctions already provided for in the
Unfair Insurance Practices Act with a judicially created cause of
action. 10
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in D'Ambrosio re-
fused to recognize the bad faith tort cause of action already
adopted by numerous other jurisdictions," the Pennsylvania
4. For an excellent historical analysis of bad faith tort litigation, see Decker,
cited at note 1.
5. 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1981).
6. D'Ambrosio, 431 A.2d at 967.
7. Id. at 970.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1171.1 to 1171.15 (1992).
9. D'Ambrosio, 431 A.2d at 970. A provision of the Unfair Insurance Practices
Act permits courts to impose civil penalties for violations of the Act. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1171.11.
10. D'Ambrosio, 431 A.2d at 970-71.
11. See D'Ambrosio, 431 A.2d at 973 n.2 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (citing cases
in which courts have adopted the bad faith tort cause of action).
Subsequent to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in D'Ambrosio,
other courts, applying Pennsylvania law, held that Pennsylvania did not recognize a
claim for bad faith against an insurer. See Giovannitti v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 690
F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Belmont v. Guarantee Nat'l Ins. Co., 644 F. Supp.
850 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Olkowski v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 584 F. Supp.
1140 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Frank v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 555 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.
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legislature created a statutory cause of action for bad faith con-
duct on the part of insurers on February 7, 1990.12 This statute
provides:
§ 8371. Actions on insurance policies
In an action arising under an insurance policy, if the court finds that the
insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured, the court may take all
of the following actions:
(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from the date the claim
was made by the insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of inter-
est plus 3%.
(2) Award punitive damages against the insurer.
(3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against the insurer."
Constitutional Challenges
Initially, insurers attempted to challenge the validity of the
bad faith statute on constitutional grounds. For example, insur-
ers argued that Section 8371 violated due process because it
failed to provide standards by which a court could impose puni-
tive damages,14 and that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague. 5 In a somewhat more creative argument, insurers have
also contended that Section 8371 violated equal protection be-
cause it punished insurers but not any other type of entity.'
Pa. 1983); Kramer v. State Farm & Casualty Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992); Baker v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins., 536 A.2d 1357 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987); Rodgers v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 496 A.2d 811 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985);
McClaine v. Allstate Ins. Co., 463 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
12. Act of February 7, 1990, No. 6, § 3, 1990 Pa. Laws 15, 15-16 (effective
July 1, 1990).
13. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (Supp. 1994).
14. See Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-
0325, 1993 WL 220621 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1993); Coyne v. Allstate Ins. Co., 771 F.
Supp. 673, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1991). In addressing this argument, the courts found that
Section 8371's punitive damage provision did not violate due process because an
award of punitive damages, which is meant to punish and deter outrageous conduct,
was governed by well-established Pennsylvania law following Section 908(2) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides policies, guidelines, and constraints
(including appellate review) sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. See
Coyne, 771 F. Supp. at 679-80; W.W. Management & Dev. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
769 F. Supp. 178, 180-81 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
15. See Empire Fire, 1993 WL 220621, at *1; Coyne, 771 F. Supp. at 676;
Scottsdale, 769 F. Supp. at 179-80. The courts rejected the vagueness argument and
concluded that the term "bad faith" had acquired a "peculiar and universally ac-
knowledged meaning" in the insurance industry and therefore there was no uncer-
tainty about the conduct prohibited by the statute. Coyne, 771 F. Supp. at 677-78.
16. See Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 91-1365, 1993 WL
479050, at *8 (E.D. Pa. November 12, 1993). In Polselli, the insurer also argued that
the court should apply a strict scrutiny analysis because a fundamental property
right of the insurer was at stake. Polse li, 1993 WL 137426, at *8. The court reject-
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These constitutional challenges were quickly disposed of by the
courts;" however, these challenges brought to light several im-
portant issues.
RECURRING ISSUES
What is 'Bad Faith"?
One problem that has persistently arisen in litigation under
Section 8371 is determining the type of conduct that the statute
proscribes. In the absence of any statutory guidance within Sec-
tion 8371 itself, courts have relied upon the "peculiar and univer-
sally acknowledged meaning" that the term "bad faith" has ac-
quired in the insurance context. 8 In fashioning a definition,
courts have stated that:
"Bad faith" on [the] part of [an] insurer is any frivolous or unfounded
refusal to pay proceeds of a policy; it is not necessary that such refusal
be fraudulent. For purposes of an action against an insurer for failure to
pay a claim, such conduct imports a dishonest purpose and means a
breach of a known duty (i.e., good faith and fair dealing), through some
motive of self-interest or ill will; mere negligence or bad judgment is not
bad faith.19
Additionally, "a plaintiff must show the absence of a reasonable
basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant's
knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis
for denying the claim."" Although reckless conduct on the part
of an insurer may constitute bad faith, mere negligence on the
ed both this argument and the equal protection argument, and decided that a prop-
erty right was not a fundamental right which would invoke a strict scrutiny analy-
sis, nor was an insurer a suspect or quasi-suspect group. Id. In applying a rational
basis analysis, the court asserted that, "[dieterring insurers from acting in bad faith
toward those who purchase their insurance policies is a legitimate state interest and
the passage of the bad faith statute is a rational means to achieve this goal," Id.
17. See Coyne, 771 F. Supp. at 677-80 (rejecting due process and vagueness
challenges); Polselli, 1993 WL 137426, at *8 (rejecting an equal protection argument).
18. See Polselli v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1994).
19. Polselli, 23 F.3d at 751 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 139 (6th ed.
1990)); see also Romano v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 646 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994).
20. American Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Galati, 776 F. Supp. 1054, 1064 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (citing D'Ambrosio, 431 A.2d at 971 and Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co.,
271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978)).
The requirement that a plaintiff show knowledge on the part of a defendant
brings to light the importance of conducting thorough discovery in a bad faith case.
For an excellent article on various discovery techniques in bad faith litigation, see
Richard D. Williams, Bad Faith Litigation and Insurer us. Insurer Disputes 1988, in
BAD FAITH LITIGATION: EMERGING TRENDS IN 1988 AND BEYOND (PLI Comm. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4224, 1988).
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part of an insurer in its actions toward the insured cannot give
rise to a finding of bad faith under Section 8371.21 Conduct on
the part of insurers that has been held to constitute bad faith
under Section 8371 includes refusal to allow the stacking2 of
underinsured motorist coverage on five automobiles owned by the
insureds,23 refusal to pay the proceeds of a life insurance poli-
cy,2 4 and failure to handle properly and make timely payments
on a fire insurance policy.2" Section 8371 has also been found to
afford potential relief for conduct such as the insurer's refusal to
participate in settlement negotiations in a dispute over under-
insured motorist benefits," the insurer's delay in paying insur-
ance benefits under a Personal Catastrophe Policy, 7 and the
insurer's failure to negotiate insurance contracts in good faith by
charging excessive premiums.2"
More often than not, however, courts have found the insurer's
alleged conduct did not give rise to a finding of bad faith. For
example, in Kauffman v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.," the
insurer brought an action seeking a declaration that it was not
required to stack underinsured motorist benefits on the plaintiffs'
insurance policy under Pennsylvania law."0 In ruling on the de-
claratory judgment action, the court concluded that stacking was
required.3 ' The insurer subsequently appealed the stacking is-
sue to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and moved to stay
21. Polselli, 23 F.3d at 751.
22. As one court explained:
Stacking is where a claimant adds all available policies together to create a
greater pool in order to satisfy his actual damages. It permits the total
amount of uninsured motorist coverage provided for all vehicles listed in an
insurance policy to be applied to the damages resulting from an accident in-
volving only on of the vehicles.
Terletsky v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 682-83 n.4
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
23. See Smokowicz v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-1452 (W.D. Pa. filed Sep-
tember 1, 1993).
24. See Butler v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., No. 92-1571 (W.D. Pa.
filed July 6, 1992).
25. See Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Nos. 91-1365 & 92-382, 1992
WL 247271 (E.D. Pa. September 23, 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 747 (3d Cir. 1994).
26. See Empire Fire, 1993 WL 220621, at *1 (on motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court found that plaintiff
alleged sufficient facts to sustain a cause of action under Section 8371).
27. See Thomson v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., No. 91-4073,
1992 WL 38132 (E.D. Pa. February 20, 1992).
28. Alexson Supply, Inc., v. Tongue, Brooks & Co., No. 93-3450, 1994 WL
161377 (E.D. Pa. April 29, 1994).
29. 794 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
30. Kauffman, 794 F. Supp. at 139.
31. Id.
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arbitration pending the appeal.32 The stay was denied and the
arbitration panel entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs."
The insurer refused to pay the arbitration award, moved to va-
cate it, and further contested the plaintiffs' petition to confirm
the award in state court.34
The plaintiffs then filed suit under Section 8371 in federal
district court alleging that the insurer's conduct in failing to pay
the arbitration award, appealing the award, and contesting the
award in state court even after the initial determination that
stacking was required, all constituted bad faith." The district
court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurer finding
that a reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that the insurer
had acted in bad faith.
36
Courts have also refused to find bad faith where the insurer
made low settlement offers and disputed an arbitration award
37
and where the insurer refused to pay the proceeds of a fire insur-
ance policy while disputing the plaintiff's interest in the property
and participation in crimes relating to the fire.' One court has
also held that an insurer acted reasonably when it reduced the
insured's disability income based on alleged misstatements by
the insured on his application for benefits. 9 The bad faith claim
was dismissed on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.'
Significantly, a plaintiff in a Section 8371 case faces a height-
ened standard of proof with respect to the allegation of bad faith.
Bad faith conduct on the part of an insurer must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence."' This heightened standard of




35. Kauffman, 794 F. Supp. at 140.
36. Id. at 141. The court noted that the insurer was entitled to appeal and
further, if the insurer "had permitted the arbitration award to become final by pay-
ing the amount of the award, it is open to question whether Aetna could have re-
covered the excess amount had the Third Circuit ultimately decided the stacking
issue in Aetna's favor." Id.
37. See Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688-89 (reversing trial court's finding of bad
faith, stating that the evidence demonstrated that the insurer's actions were "reason-
ably based").
38. See Alberici v. Safeguard Ins. Co., No. 78-10515 (C.P. Delaware Cty. June
14, 1994).
39. See American Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Galati, 776 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
40. Galati, 776 F. Supp. at 1065. The court concluded that "the pleadings
demonstrate a reasonable basis for every action taken." Id. at 1064.
41. See Polselli, 23 F.3d at 750 (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 134 A.2d 223, 229 (Pa. 1957)).
Vol. 33:451
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scope of bad faith, may account for the failure of the majority of
courts to conclude that the insurer acted in bad faith.
Punitive Damages
Section 8371 provides for the imposition of punitive damages if
bad faith is found.42 This raises the issue of what standard a
fact-finder should apply in assessing whether an award of puni-
tive damages is appropriate. The plaintiff in Alberici v. Safeguard
Ins. Co." argued that the standard for imposing punitive dam-
ages under Section 8371 should be a lower standard than that
set forth in the Restatement of Torts." In Alberici, the plaintiff
asserted, inter alia, a cause of action under Section 8371 against
her insurer for bad faith processing of a fire insurance policy
claim.45 The plaintiff alleged that the insurer failed to promptly
take her deposition and failed to offer a reasonable settlement
while the insurer disputed plaintiffs insurable interest and in-
vestigated possible criminal conduct which caused the fire. 6 Al-
though the court found that the insurer had not acted in bad
faith toward the plaintiff, it nevertheless addressed plaintiffs
argument that the standard for imposing punitive damages un-
der Section 8371 was different than that set forth in the Restate-
ment of Torts.47
Relying on the punitive damage standard set forth in Feld v.
Merriam," the court indicated that the standard to utilize in
determining whether punitive damages were warranted in a bad
faith case was the same standard as that set forth in the Restate-
ment of Torts. 9 The court asserted that a plaintiff seeking an
award of punitive damages in a bad faith case therefore had to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,"0 that the insurer's
42. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371(2) (Supp. 1994). The award of punitive dam-
ages is permissible, not mandatory. Id.
43. No. 78-10515 (Pa. C.P., Delaware Cty. June 14, 1994).
44. Alberici, slip op. at 11. Section 908(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides that:
Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of
the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.
In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the
character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the
plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the
defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
45. Alberici, slip op. at 9.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id. at 11.
48. 485 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1984).
49. Alberici, slip op. at 11 (citing Feld, 485 A.2d at 747).
50. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1098 (Pa. 1985); see also
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conduct was malicious, wanton, reckless, willful or oppressive."
Importantly, the court in Alberici noted that due to the differing
standards that were involved in finding bad faith and awarding
punitive damages, "not all conduct which may suggest bad faith'
on the part of an insurer necessarily warrants the imposition of
punitive damages." 2
Who Decides Whether the Insurer Has Acted in Bad Faith?
Although Section 8371 explicitly states that "if the court finds
that the insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured,"'
some courts have permitted the jury to decide the issue of bad
faith.' The seminal case addressing the issue of whether a
plaintiff asserting a cause of action under Section 8371 is entitled
to a trial by jury is Thomson v. Prudential Property and Casualty
Co.'5s In Thomson, the plaintiff argued that the Seventh Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution," mandated that her
bad faith claim be presented to a jury, despite the contrary lan-
guage of the statute.57 The court concluded that under the first
prong of the two-part test set forth in Cox v. Keystone Carbon
Co.," the plain language of the statute clearly demonstrated
Polselli, 23 F.3d at 750.
51. Alberici, slip op. at 12 (citing Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355 (Pa.
1963)).
52. Alberici, slip op. at 11. See also Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 690 (raising but not
addressing the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to award punitive
damages after finding that insurer had acted in bad faith); accord Younis Bros. &
Co., v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., 1994 WL 645807, at *1 (E.D. Pa. November 16,
1994) (jury found insurance company acted in bad faith but that conduct was not
outrageous and no punitive damages should be awarded).
53. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
54. See Smokowicz v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-1452 (W.D. Pa. September
1, 1993); MacFarland v. United States Fidelity Guarantee Co., 818 F. Supp. 108, 112
(E.D. Pa. 1993); but cf. Gilderman v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 91-6353, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18481, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1991); Coyne v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
771 F. Supp. 673, 676 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that the trial judge, not the jury,
determines the issue of bad faith under Section 8371); Carson v. I.T.T. Hartford Ins.
Group, No. 91-3113, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10451, at *9 n.7 (E.D. Pa. July 24,
1991).
55. No. 91-4073, 1992 WL 210088 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1992).
56. The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
57. Thomson, 1992 WL 210088, at *3.
58. 861 F.2d 390, 393 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990). In Cox,
the court held that when determining whether a statutory cause of action created a
right to a trial by jury, a court had to first look to the legislative intent to deter-
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that the legislature intended that a court, and not a jury, decide
an action under Section 8371."g
Turning to the second prong of the Cox test, the Thomson court
noted that historically, the constitutional entitlement to a trial by
jury depended on whether the subject matter or remedy involved
was legal or equitable in nature." The court found that because
the plaintiff was requesting legal relief in the form of damages,
the Seventh Amendment mandated that a jury hear the
plaintiffs Section 8371 claims.61
What are Attorney's Fees and Costs?
Section 8371 provides that a court may assess costs and attor-
ney fees against the insurer.' The statute does not, however,
provide an explanation of what those attorney's fees and costs
may be, nor does it provide a standard for the imposition of such
fees and costs. 3 Are the attorney's fees and costs assessed for
the bad faith action or for the underlying action between the
insurer and the insured for the recovery of benefits? Some courts
have found that the attorney's fees and costs should be assessed
for the bad faith litigation and are properly presented by petition
to the court after the conclusion of the bad faith case.' Other
courts, however, have not only submitted the issue to the jury,
mine whether a trial by jury was intended, and secondly, a -court had to determine
whether the Seventh Amendment mandated that a jury hear the statutory cause of
action. Cox, 861 F.2d at 393. In setting forth this test, the court in Cox noted that
a court had to first look to the legislative history to determine whether a trial by
jury was intended, because '[i]t is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the (con-
stitutional] question may be avoided." Id. at 393 n.5 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 577 (1978) (quoting United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363, 369 (1971))).
59. Thomson, 1992 WL 210088, at *3.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *4. But compare Younis Bros. & Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co.,
1994 WL 645807 at *4-7, (E.D. Pa. November 16, 1994) (finding that the Seventh
Amendment mandated that bad faith and punitive damages issues be decided by the
jury, but that issues regarding interest and attorney's fees were equitable in nature
and therefore should be decided by the court).
62. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371(3) (Supp. 1994).
63. See Oldham v. State Farm Ins. Co., No, 94-1311 (W.D. Pa. filed August 5,
1994) (insurer argued that the section of the statute which allows a court to award
interest is unconstitutional because it permits the award of pre-judgment interest
without -an assessment of fault for the delay). But see Younis Bros., 1994 WL
645807, *4 (concluding that the requirement that a court find bad faith prior to
awarding attorney's fees, costs and interest, provided a sufficient standard to with-
stand a due process challenge),
64. See Polselli v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., No. 91-1365, 1993 WL
479050 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 1993).
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but have allowed recovery for the costs and attorney's fees that
the plaintiff incurred in attempting to recover proceeds of the
insurance policy in the underlying contractual dispute, but not
for the bad faith litigation itself."8 For example, a federal dis-
trict court allowed the jury to award interest on the amount of
the underlying claim that was being disputed.'
Retroactivity7
Many cases have addressed the problem of whether Section
8371 can be retroactively applied." The initial challenges to the
retroactivity of the statute were made by insurers who argued
that Section 8371 could not be applied to a contract of insurance
entered into before July 1, 1990, the effective date of the stat-
ute. 9 The insurers argued that Section 8371 effectuated a sub-
stantive change that would materially alter the relationship be-
tween the insurer and the insured and therefore any application
of Section 8371 to a contract of insurance entered into before
July 1, 1990 should be forbidden.7 1 Most of the courts that have
addressed this argument, however, have generally found that
"[Slection 8371 may be applied to any insurance contract regard-
65. See Smokowicz, transcript at 288 (finding that the plaintiffs had incurred
$150,000 in costs and attorney's fees including fees for expert opinions incurred in
attempting prove that the plaintiffs five insurance policies could be stacked). Cf.
Brandt v. Superior Ct., 693 P.2d 796, 800 (Cal. 1985) (holding that because the
attorney's fees were an element of damages, they were to be determined by the trier
of fact). The court in Brandt further held that in a first-party bad faith claim, an
insured could recover attorney's fees incurred in recovering benefits due under an
insurance policy as an element of damage proximately caused by the bad faith, but
that the insured could not recover the attorney's fees that were attributable to the
bad faith action itself. Brandt, 693 P.2d at 798.
66. See Smokowicz, transcript at 235, 258-59. The amount of the underlying
claim was $500,000. Id. The interest was awarded from the time the plaintiffs first
made their demand for the benefits until the time that the benefits were paid. Id.
The interest was apportioned as follows: interest on loss of use of $500,000 for one
and one half years and interest on loss of use of $300,000 for twenty-one months.
Id. The interest was apportioned in this manner because $200,000 was paid by the
insurance company one and one-half years after the initial request for the $500,000
was made by plaintiffs, Id. The final $300,000 payment was made after the arbitra-
tion panel concluded that all five insurance policies could be stacked. Id.
67. A Pennsylvania statute provides that [nlo statute shall be construed to be
retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly." 1
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1926 (Supp. 1994).
68. See, e.g., Mendel v. Home Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 1206, 1217 (E.D. Pa.
1992).
69. See Colantuno v. Aetna Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 908, 910 (3d Cir. 1992); Ameri-
can Franklin Life Ins, Co. v. Galati, 776 F. Supp. 1054, 1063 (E.D. Pa. 1991);
Okkerse v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 663, 665 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1993).
70. Okkerse, 625 A.2d at 665.
1995 Bad Faith Insurance Litigation in Pennsylvania 461
less of date,"7 ' because the insurer's obligations under policies
issued prior to July 1, 1990, were not changed by Section 8371.72
The courts have reasoned that Section 8371 did not change the
terms of the insurance contract, nor did it alter the rights of the
parties that vested under the contract73 because insurers had a
duty to act in good faith toward their insureds prior to the enact-
ment of the bad faith statute.74
Courts have focused on the time of the alleged bad faith, and
not on the contract date. 7' As long as the bad faith conduct oc-
curred after the effective date of the statute, courts have general-
ly held that a bad faith cause of action could be asserted re-
gardless of when the insurance contract was entered into.
76
An exception to this general rule occurs when the bad faith
allegation is that the insurer improperly denied benefits before
the effective date of the statute.77 A subsequent re-affirmance by
the insurer to deny benefits, after the effective date of the stat-
ute, is insufficient to give rise to an actionable post-enactment
bad faith allegation.7' As one court has stated, the "post-en-
abling date activity must be separate acts of bad faith, not a
continuation of a previous denial.
" 7
1
71. See Colantuno, 980 F.2d at 910.
72. Okkerse, 625 A.2d at 665.
73. Id.
74. Galati, 776 F. Supp. at 1063.
75. As one court noted, "[t]he relevant inquiry [in determining whether the
statute is being retroactively applied] ...is not the contract date, but rather when
[the insurer] is alleged to have committed the bad faith conduct." Colantuno, 980
F.2d at 910 (citing Coyne v. Allstate Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 673, 675 (E.D. Pa.
1991)).
76. See Galati, 776 F. Supp. at 1063; Okkerse, 625 A.2d at 666; see also Boyce
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 842 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Coyne v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Seeger by Seeger v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
776 F. Supp. 986 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Boland v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Pa. D. &
C.4th 27 (C.P. Blair Cty. 1991). But see Bryant v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 90-
5637, 1990 WL 223126, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1990) (concluding that applying Sec-
tion 8371 to a contract formed before July 1, 1990, would alter contractual relations
existing between the parties).
77. See generally Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 763 F. Supp.
121, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
78. See Rottmund v. Continental Assurance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa.
1992); Barbaro v. Old Line Life Ins. Co., 785 F. Supp. 70, 71 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (dis-
missing plaintiffs cause of action under Section 8371 for failure to allege bad faith
conduct which occurred after the effective date of the statute).
79. Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1106.
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Who is an Insured?
While it may appear that the statute is clear in providing a
remedy for an "insured" for the bad faith conduct of the insurer,
questions have been raised, regarding who qualifies as the in-
sured. For example, if an insurance company refuses to pay the
proceeds of a life insurance policy and the named beneficiary files
suit alleging bad faith on the part of the insurer, the insurer may
argue that the named beneficiary is not the "insured" party who
is protected by the statute."0 In addressing the contention that
only a named insured may assert a cause of action under Section
8371, courts have generally found that Section 8371 does not
apply exclusively to the specifically named insured party; rather,
"the text of the statute only requires that the alleged wrong was
directed at the insured.""' Therefore, in an action for failure to
pay the proceeds of a life insurance policy, 2 a beneficiary should
be able to assert a cause of action under Section 8371.' The
refusal of the insurer to pay the proceeds certainly is directed
toward the insured in that the insured bargained for and paid
the premiums so that proceeds from the policy would be paid at
the time of his or her death. Failure to pay such proceeds contra-
80. See, e.g., Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1108.
81. Thatcher v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 92-2093, 1992 WL 210591, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 25, 1992); see also Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., No. 93-0325, 1993 WL 220621 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1993).
82. Cf. Strutz v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 609 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992). Plaintiffs filed suit against insurer and its insured to recover for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident. Strutz, 609 A.2d at 570. Plaintiffs asserted a
cause of action against the insurer under Section 8371 arguing that they were the
third-party beneficiaries of the insurance contract between the defendant insured and
her insurer. Id. at 570-71. The court rejected the third-party beneficiary theory and
found that a third-party claimant could not assert a Section 8371 cause of action
against an insurer because, "the insurer assumes a fiduciary position toward the
insured and becomes liable to act in good faith and with due care in representing
the interests of the insured." Id. at 571. Because the alleged bad faith conduct was
not directed toward the insured, the court found that the trial court properly dis-
missed the Section 8371 claim. Id. See also Fran & John's Doylestown Auto Center,
Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 638 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (rejecting
appellant's third party beneficiary argument). The court in Fran & John's also stat-
ed:
[Ilt would be inappropriate to confer the status of third-party beneficiary upon
appellant because the contract of insurance between appellee and its insured
does not reflect this to be the intention of the parties. Appellee owes no con-
tractual or legal duty of performance to appellant, as the contract of insurance
is for the benefit and protection of the insureds only.
Fran & John's, 638 A.2d at 1026.
83. See Horowitz v. Federal Kempler Life Assurance Co., 861 F. Supp. 1252,
1262 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (applying Section 8371 in case involving refusal to pay life
insurance proceeds, but finding no bad faith).
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venes the wishes and express directions of the insured.
Additionally, it should be noted that the assignment of the
right to recovery of insurance proceeds by the insured to a third
party does not prevent the assignee from asserting a cause of
action under Section 83 7 1." Bad faith claims alone have also
been found to be assignable.' If, however, the contract of insur-
ance provides that the insurer must consent to any assignment
and the insured fails to obtain the required consent, the assign-
ment of the bad faith claim may not be recognized."
Who is an Insurer?
Under the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (the "UIPA"), an
insurance agent, as well as the insurance carrier, may be liable
for unfair trade practices.17 Section 8371 does not indicate, how-
ever, whether an insurance agent is an insurer who may be liable
for a bad faith claim. In the absence of any statutory definition of
"insurer," courts and practitioners must glean from other statutes
and similar cases the scope of the term "insurer." In T & N PLC
v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association,' the court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Pennsylvania Insurance Guar-
anty Association was an insurer within the meaning of Section
8371.89 The court turned to other Pennsylvania statutes pertain-
ing to insurance - the UIPA and the Insurance Guaranty Asso-
ciation Act' - and found that the Pennsylvania Insurance
Guaranty Association was not an insurer that could be sued
under Section 8371.91
Although the court in American Franklin Life Insurance Co. v.
Galati,' did not directly address the issue of whether a cause of
84. See Thatcher, 1992 WL 210591, at *3.
85. See Empire, 1993 WL 220621, at *2.
86. See High-Tech Enterprises v. General Accident Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 639 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993); see also Fran & John's Auto Center, 638 A.2d at 1023.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.3 (1992) (defining "person" as "any individu-
al . . . including agents, brokers and adjusters").
88. 800 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
89. T & N PLC, 800 F. Supp. at 1261.
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1701.101 - 1701.605 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
91. T & N PLC, 800 F. Supp. at 1262. The court noted that:
[The Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association] is not in the "business" of
insurance within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices
Act, or otherwise. PIGA issues no policies, collects no premiums, makes no
profits, and assumes no contractual obligations to the insureds. Its "business"
is confined to providing insureds with a limited form of protection from finan-
cial loss occasioned by the insolvency of their insurer.
Id. at 1263.
92. 776 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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action under Section 8371 could be asserted against the insur-
ance agent who was a third-party defendant in the case, the
court intimated that if the insured "has an action against Ameri-
can Franklin and [the insurance agent] for bad faith.., it may
only arise out of actions taken by American Franklin and [the
insurance agent] on or after the effective date of Section 8371.'e
The court found, however, that the insured had failed to allege
any conduct on the part of the insurance agent that occurred on
or after July 1, 1990, and therefore dismissed any claims against
the agent on that basis, without addressing whether the agent
could be liable under the statute.94
It does not seem appropriate, however, to allow an insurance
agent to be named as a defendant in an action pursuant to Sec-
tion 8371. According to the universally acknowledged meaning of
insurer within the industry, an insurer is:
[An] underwriter or insurance company with whom a contract of insur-
ance is made. The one who assumes risk or underwrites a policy, or the
underwriter or company with whom [the] contract of insurance is
made."5
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association
Act provides that an insurer is, "any insurance company, associa-
tion or exchange which is authorized to write and is engaged in
writing within this Commonwealth, on a direct basis, property
and casualty insurance policies."" Clearly, under these defini-
tions an insurance agent would not qualify as an insurer and
thus could not be sued under Section 8371. Although the UIPA
defines "persons" to include insurance agents and adjusters, Sec-
tion 8371 does not include persons who act in bad faith toward
the insured, but instead applies only to "insurers." The UIPA
definition of "person" is therefore not applicable in determining
who is an "insurer" for purposes of Section 8371.
93. Galati, 776 F. Supp. at 1063.
94. Id. Indeed, it does not appear that this argument was even raised by the
parties.
95. T & N PLC, 800 F. Supp. at 1262 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 139
(6th ed. 1990)).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1701.103 (1992).
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The Role of the UIPA in Bad Faith Litigation
The UIPA sets forth an extensive regulatory scheme which
defines unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
practices of persons in the insurance industry."7 Courts have
addressed whether these regulations may be used to determine
whether an insurer has acted in bad faith pursuant to Section
8371. In Romano v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,' the
Pennsylvania Superior Court indicated that a trial court may
consider "the alleged conduct constituting violations of the UIPA
or the regulations in determining whether an insurer ... acted in
bad faith."" Importantly, while the UIPA may provide guidance
in determining what constitutes bad faith, an insurer's violation
of the UIPA should not be construed as per se bad faith."°
Emotional Distress Damages
In Duffy v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 1 the plaintiff
sought to recover, inter alia, emotional distress damages under
Section 8371 after the defendant insurer refused to pay more
than $500 of plaintiffs restitution for a driving under the influ-
ence criminal violation. 2 The defendant insurer was allegedly
obligated to pay the restitution under plaintiffs insurance poli-
cy."3 As a result of the defendant insurer's refusal to pay the
restitution, the plaintiff was discharged from the Accelerated
Rehabilitation Disposition Program and the charges against her
were reinstated.' The insurer, after subsequently affirming
that the restitution would be paid under the policy, confessed
judgment against the plaintiff insured.' 5 The insurer did not
pay the balance of the restitution it was obligated to pay under
the policy until the plaintiff moved to open the judgment."° On
a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.5 (1992).
98. 646 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
99. Romano, 646 A.2d at 1233. Accord MacFarland v. United States Fidelity &
Guarantee Co., 818 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Rottmund v. Continental Assur-
ance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Coyne v. Allstate Ins. Co., 771 F.
Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
100. See Romano, 646 A.2d at 1232 (holding that the UIPA did not provide a
private cause of action).
101. No. 93-1474, 1993 WL 475501 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1993).






upon which relief could be granted, the court found that under
the terms of Section 8371, there could be no recovery for emotion-
al distress damages."7 The court reasoned that Section 8371
was enacted as:
[A] direct response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
D'Ambrosio, in which the court declined to judicially impose punitive and
emotional distress damages for an insurer's bad faith contractual breach,
expressly leaving that to the legislature .... The legislature answered
the call, but only partially: it limited recovery to punitives, interest, court
costs, and attorneys fees. The act was silent as to damages for emotional
distress. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius... the legislature did not
intend to provide for emotional distress damages."
To date, no court has allowed emotional distress damages.
Bad Faith Conduct During the Course of Litigation
An issue of particular importance under Section 8371 is wheth-
er alleged bad faith conduct on the part of the insurer during the
course of litigation can give rise to a cause of action under that
section. Although three United States District Court decisions
have indicated that an insurer can be liable under Section 8371
for bad faith conduct during the course of litigation,'09 there ap-
pears to be some confusion over what "conduct during the course
of litigation" actually means.
In Rottmund v. Continental Assurance Co.,1" 0 the court found
that the insurer's "intentional misdesignation of a corporate de-
ponent" and "concealment of the absence of new facts and circum-
stances which would justify the defendant's denial of its own
prior allegations regarding the identity of the murderer of [the
insured]" during the course of litigation could potentially give
rise to a finding of bad faith under Section 8371."' In reaching
its decision to deny defendant's motion in limine to preclude the
plaintiff from presenting any claim for damages under Section
8371, the court relied upon Kauffman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co."' Concluding that Kauffman permitted recovery for bad
107. Duffy, 1993 WL 475501, at *4.
108. Id. (citing D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Natl Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 431
A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. 1981)).
109. See Albertini Restaurants, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., No. 93-1669,
1993 WL 209583 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1993); Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1104;
Kauffman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 794 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
110. 813 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
111. Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1109.
112. Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1109-10 (citing Kauffman v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 794 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1992)). In Kauffman, the court noted, "this
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faith misconduct during litigation, the Rottmund court deter-
mined that the alleged acts of the insurer could constitute bad
faith under Section 8371.113
The Rottmund court's reliance on the decision in Kauffman is
misplaced. Although the court in Kauffman noted that the con-
duct at issue "occurred during the pendency of litigation,"""
that court was addressing the issue of whether Section 8371
provided an independent cause of action or whether a plaintiff
had to assert a cause of action in the underlying contractual
dispute between the parties."5 More importantly, however, that
court was addressing different allegations of bad faith than those
at issue in Rottmund. In Kauffman, the allegations concerned the
insurer's obligations to the insured under an insurance poli-
cy. "6 The insurer's actions at issue in Rottmund, such as
misdesignating a corporate deponent, did not concern the
insurer's obligations under the insurance policy.
Furthermore, sanctions for such conduct are more appropriate-
ly addressed through the rules of civil procedure. In fact, the
defendant in Rottmund raised the argument that the exclusive
remedy for any alleged misdesignation of a corporate deponent
was "sanctions for harassment, unnecessary delay, or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation in the course of discovery," under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 7 However, the Rottmund
court found that no authority had been cited by the parties that
indicated that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided an
exclusive remedy.1 8 The court further found that there was no
"indication that [the Federal Rules] preempt State law that at-
tempts to address a very specific problem: bad faith conduct of
case presents an unusual situation in that plaintiffs allege bad faith, not in the pre.
litigation handling of their claim, but in conduct that occurred during the pendency
of litigation, at a stage when Aetna's declaratory judgment action was before the
Third Circuit." Kauffman, 794 F. Supp. at 140 (emphasis added).
113. Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1110.
114. Kauffman, 794 F. Supp. at 140.
115. Id.
116. Id. In Kauffman, the allegations of bad faith on the part of the insurer
were:
(1) [the insurer's] insistence on proceeding to arbitration, rather than tendering
the $1 million limit under the policy, after [the] court's decision of January 4,
1991, on the stacking issue; (2) [the insurer's] opposition to plaintiffs' motion
to confirm the arbitration award in state court; and (3) [the insurer's] refusal
to pay the remaining amount of the arbitration award until the Third Circuit
rendered its decision on the stacking issue [on appeal].
Id.
117. Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1110 (citing FED R. Cirv. P. 26(g), 37(a)(2)).
118. Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1110 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965)).
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insurers, even where that bad faith conduct occurs in the context
of litigation.""'
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not be the
exclusive remedy, holding insurers liable for conduct such as
misdesignating a corporate deponent does not comport with the
purpose of Section 8371. The goal of Section 8371 is to ensure
that the special fiduciary relationship between insurers and their
insured is not abused, and to require that insurers uphold their
duty of good faith and fair dealing.2 '
The fiduciary obligation of the insurer arises in the relation-
ship with the insured with respect to the contract of insurance.
The insurer is not, simply by virtue of being a litigant in a civil
action, assuming a special fiduciary position. Thus, holding the
insurer liable under Section 8371 for bad faith that has nothing
to do with the special fiduciary relationship is unfair, unneces-
sary, and has no statutory foundation. The conduct that Section
8371 seeks to deter involves only the relationship between the
insured and the insurer. Bad faith actions should be confined to
allegations which arise as a result of this relationship.
This proposition does not exclude bad faith conduct on the part
of the insurer simply because it occurs during the pendency of an
action; rather, it simply precludes allegations of bad faith that
are unrelated to the insurer/insured relationship. 2' For exam-
ple, an insurer's frivolous initiation of a declaratory judgment
action - i.e., where the insurer unreasonably and without suffi-
cient basis disputed its obligation to pay proceeds under an in-
surance policy - could give rise to a cause of action for bad faith.
However, if an insurer defendant improperly removed a cause of
action under an insurance policy from state court to federal court
- i.e., the action was improper because the amount in controver-
sy was insufficient for federal court - the insured would not
have a Section 8371 cause of action because the insurer's action
did not violate the fiduciary relationship.
The proposition that Section 8371 is aimed at deterring con-
duct involving only the insured/insurer relationship is further
supported by the text of Section 8355 which was enacted the
same day as Section 8371.122 Section 8355 provides sanctions
119. Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1110.
120. See, e.g., Romano, 646 A.2d at 1231. The court noted that "[t]he insurer's
duty of good faith ... is contractual and arises because the insurance company
assumes a fiduciary status by virtue of the policy's provisions which give the insurer
the right to handle claims and control settlement." Id.
121. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (Supp. 1994).
122. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8355. Under Rule 1451 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has suspended, in part,
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punishing an attorney for, inter alia, filing pleadings, motions, or
other papers in bad faith.12 The sanctions include assessment
of costs, reasonable attorney fees, and possibly a civil penalty not
to exceed $10,000."'1 Clearly, if the legislature intended to in-
clude the bad faith conduct of attorneys during the course of
litigation as conduct punishable under Section 8371, there would
have been no need to enact section 8355. As the court in Boland
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 125 stated, "the terms of
Section 8371 as a companion provision to section 8355 in Act 6
may not be extended to the conduct of attorneys."128
Does Section 8371 Provide an Independent Cause of Action?
Many courts have determined that Section 8371 is not merely
an additional remedy for a plaintiff in a contractual dispute with
an insurance company.'27 This has very important implications.
First, this allows an insured to commence suit under Section
8371 even if the underlying claim for benefits has been re-
solved." 8 In other words, a plaintiff may commence a separate
and independent suit solely under Section 8371.2' Secondly, an
insurer may move to sever the bad faith claim from the underly-
ing contract claim and have them tried separately. 3 '
the operation of Section 8355. See PA. R. CIV. P. 1451.
123. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8355.
124. Id.
125. 9 Pa. D. & C.4th 27 (C.P. Blair Cty. 1991).
126. Boland, 9 Pa. D. & C.4th at 37 n.4.
127. See Kauffman, 794 F. Supp. at 140; Romano, 846 A.2d at 1231; March v.
Paradise Mut. Ins. Co., 646 A.2d 1254, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
128. See, e.g., March, 646 A.2d at 1256.
129. But ef Winterberg v. CNA Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1994) The
court, while recognizing that Section 8371 created a separate and independent cause
of action, found that a claim under Section 8371 had to be "related to at least one
other colorable claim over which the court has jurisdiction." Winterberg, 868 F. Supp.
at 722. This result not only ignores the clear import of the term "separate and inde-
pendent cause of action," but it also provides an opportunity for insurers to avoid
liability for bad faith conduct. For example, if an insurer initiates a declaratory
judgment action in order to dispute its obligation to pay the proceeds of an insur-
ance policy without reasonable basis and in bad faith, and the declaratory judgment
action is subsequently settled, the insured should still be able to file suit, in the
forum of the insured's choice, against the insurer for bad faith under Section 8371.
See, e.g., Albertini Restaurants, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-1669, 1993
WL 209583 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
130. See MacFarland v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 818 F. Supp.
108, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Thomson v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., No.
91-4073, 1992 WL 210088, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1992).
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Preemption
Several United States District Court decisions have addressed
the issue of whether Section 8371 is preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")131 when the insur-
ance contract is part of an employee benefit plan."3 2 The courts
have found that Section 8371 is preempted by ERISA because it
does not fall within the category of state laws which are exempt-
ed from ERISA's savings clause.' Therefore, where the under-
lying policy is part of an employee benefit plan that is covered by
ERISA, the insured may not bring an action for bad faith based
on Section 8371.
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
An insurer's alleged bad faith conduct regarding the medical
necessity'34 of first-party medical benefits claims cannot be the
subject of a cause of action under Section 8371 because Section
1797 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 3 1 pro-
vides the exclusive remedy for the review and payment of first-
party insurance claims.3 ' The rationale that courts have used
131. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended by the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1986
& Supp. 1994).
132. See Garner v. Capital Blue Cross, 859 F. Supp. 145 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Ruth
v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America, No. 94-3969, 1994 WL 481246 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 6, 1994); Rallis v. Trans World Music Corp., No. 93-6100, 1994 WL 96264
(E.D. Pa. March 25, 1994); Ferry v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, No. 93-
709, 1994 WL 500964 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 14 1994); Booz v. Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 93-
2326, 1993 WL 313372 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1993).
133. See, e.g., Ruth, 1994 WL 481246, at *5.
134. See Barnum v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 155 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1993); see also Seeger, 776 F. Supp. at 990. In Seeger, an insurer questioned
whether an insured's medical expenses were covered under its policy; the court indi-
cated that that issue was "obviously not amenable to resolution by the procedures
set forth in section 1797(b)." Seeger, 776 F. Supp. at 990. Accord Knox v. Worldwide
Ins. Group, 140 Pittsburgh Leg. J. 185 (C.P. Allegheny Cty. 1992). The court in
Knox asserted:
Whether or not the (medical] treatment was related to the automobile accident
is not an issue for which § 1797(b) provides peer review evaluations...
[therefore] § 1797(b) does not bar bad faith claims under § 8371 for a denial
of coverage which is based on findings of a peer review organization on issues
for which there is no provision for a peer review under § 1797(b).
Knox, 140 Pittsburgh Leg. J. at 189.
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1701.101 to 1701.605 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
136. See Grove v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 855 F. Supp. 113 (W.D. Pa.
1993); Stepanuk v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., No. 92-6095., 1993 WL
489209, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 1993); Fetterman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co., No. 93-3940, 1993 WL 460803 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 1993); Danley v. State
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in reaching this conclusion is that the general provisions of Sec-
tion 8371 conflict with the specific provisions of the Motor Vehi-
cle Financial Responsibility Law governing the conduct of insur-
ers.137 However, at least three courts have asserted that with
regard to first-party wage-loss benefits, an insured may state a
cause of action under Section 8371."3
Does Section 8371 Apply to All Types of Insurance Policies?
Despite vigorous objections on the part of insurers, courts have
generally held that Section 8371 does not apply exclusively to
motor vehicle insurance policies. This argument was raised by
insurers who reasoned that since Section 8371 was enacted as
part of an act entitled "Motor Vehicle Insurance, Pleadings, Oper-
ators of Commercial Vehicles, etc.," the legislature must have
intended that bad faith actions only be brought under motor ve-
hicle insurance policies.'39 This argument has been rejected by
the courts." Many different types of insurance policies have
been the subject of Section 8371 actions.'
CONCLUSION
Even though Pennsylvania's bad faith statute is still relatively
new, its adoption has spawned a great deal of litigation. This liti-
gation has been complicated by the difficulty encountered by
courts and practitioners in interpreting the provisions of Section
8371. Much of this difficulty can be attributed to the lack of legis-
lative guidance provided in the statute itself. This article has
been an attempt to identify the many issues raised by the stat-
Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 808 F. Supp. 399 (M.D. Pa. 1992); see also Gemini
Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 91-
0013, 1993 WL 409922 (E.D. Pa. October 12, 1993), affd, 40 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1994).
137. See Seeger, 776 F. Supp. at 989; Barnum, 635 A.2d at 158.
138. See Weisbein v. The Home Ins. Co., No. 93-6909, 1994 WL 121033 (E.D.
Pa. April 11, 1994) (finding that Section 1716 penalizes insurers for different conduct
than Section 8371 and therefore a plaintiff can claim punitive damages under Sec-
tion 8371 for denial of a wage-loss claim under an auto insurance policy); Danley,
808 F. Supp at 402; Seeger, 776 F. Supp. at 991. But cf. Riddell v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Ins. Co., No. 91-1461, 1992 WL 209971, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 9, 1992) (find-
ing irreconcilable conflict between Sections 8371 and 1716 and holding that Section
8371 could not be applied to claims for wage-loss benefits).
139. See Boring v. Erie Ins. Group, 641 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
140. See Boring, 641 A.2d at 1192.
141. Id. at 1192-93 (citations omitted). See also Zabrecky v. American Title Ins.
Co., No. 93-4464, 1994 WL 416286, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1994) (applying Section
8371 to an action on a title insurance policy); Turner Construction Co. v. First In-
demnity of America Ins. Co., 829 F. Supp. 752, 763-64 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (applying
Section 8371 to an action on a surety bond).
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ute, to review the recent judicial treatments and interpretations
of these issues, and to offer some suggestions for future cases.
Doubtless, in the absence of any additional legislative action, new
issues and interpretations will continue to arise.
